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QUASI-CONTRACTS-DURESS-RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS MADE UNDER
EcoNOMIC PRESSURE-On September r, 1939, plaintiff company, engaged in the
business of refining, purchasing, transporting and selling gasoline and other petroleum products, entered into two written contracts with defendant retailer. One
contract provided for purchase by defendant from plaintiff of real property by
monthly installments totaling $32,000, and the other stipulated for purchase
from plaintiff of all the gasoline and petroleum products handled by defendant
for a period of five years from date. Defendant defaulted in the payment of
monthly installments on the real estate contract, and plaintiff brought suit to
recover the unpaid balance of $15,200 and sought foreclosure of the contract.
Defendant admitted the material allegations of the complaint and counterclaimed
for the sum of $ro,r88.86; alleging that plaintiff had overcharged defendant by
that amount under the supply contract and that defendant had paid the overcharge under protest rather than risk jeopardizing his position under the supply
contract or incur the penalty stipulated for purchasing elsewhere. The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and for the defendant
on the counterclaim, finding as a matter of law that defendant was overcharged
under the contract in the amount claimed and that defendant waived no known
right in paying the overcharges when demanded.1 On appeal by plaintiff from
the judgment on the counterclaim, held, reversed. ( r) Defendant could not
recover money paid voluntarily and without compulsion and with full knowledge of the facts and without fraud, duress or extortion. ( 2) Where there was
no evidence of a threat to cancel the supply contract, defendant had an adequate remedy for construction of the contract under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act.2 Pure Oil Co. 'l/. Tucker, (C.C.A. 8th, 1947) r64 F. (2d)
945·
That money paid under claim of right cannot be recovered is a general
rule of law,3 but a recognized exception permits recovery of payments made
under economic duress,4 in which case the policy favoring finality of settlements
of disputed claims is outweighed by the policy opposing unjust enrichment.5
(D.C. Iowa 1947) 70 F. Supp. 766.
Judicial Code, § 274d, 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 400.
3 40 AM. JuR., Payment, § 157.
4 40 AM. JuR., Payment, § 161.
With reference to the use of the word
"voluntary," it has been said, "This form of statement seems objectionable because
it uses the word 'voluntary' in a very artificial sense, embracing the negation not only of
duress but of all the other grounds for recovery of money paid, a use of the term which
is liable to misunderstanding." Durfee, "Recovery of Money Paid under Duress of
Legal Proceedings in Michigan-Welch v. Beeching," 15 MICH. L. REv. 228 at 228,
note 2 (1917).
5 See 15 MICH. L. REV. 228-230 (1917); and Dawson, "Duress Through Civil
Litigation," 45 MICH. L. REv. 571 at 578 (1947).
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The problem, then, is to define economic duress-in other words, to determine
what types and degrees of pressure are condemned.6 As in other phases of the
law of restitution, the extent of permissible pressure varies with the type of fact
situation presented. 7 The problem in the principal case involves a payment
· exacted because of an underlying fear that a refusal would result in a breach
of contract causing large capital and business losses. The courts have not
always been willing to recognize such pressure as ground for recovery, 8 but refusal has been severely criticized, especially where there is e;rtreme divergence
in the respective bargaining positions of the parties.9 By placing the decision
in the principal case on two grounds, the court leaves some doubt as to the
relative weight given to each. If the court was convinced that the facts show
no threat of breach of contract, it is unnecessary to consider the adequacy of
the remedy suggested as a source of relief to the defendant at the time of payment. On the other hand, if the court concerned itself with the plight of the
defendant in case of refusal of further deliveries of gasoline arising out of nonpayment, then the question of the adequacy of the proposed remedy becomes
vital.10 Even if it be recognized that the procedure followed under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act is a summary one, the defendant is forced to specu6
That we can neither look exclusively, on the one hand, for acts on the part
of the dominant party that are independently unlawful, nor exclusively, on the other
hand, to the subjective position of the dominated party, seems clear. Durfee, "Recovery
of Money Paid under Duress of Legal Proceedings in Michigan-Welch v. Beeching,"
15 MICH. L. REV. 228 at 229-230 (1917); Dawson, "Economic Duress-An Essay
ln Perspective," 45 MICH, L. REv. 253 at 287-288 (1947).
7
Explanation for such differences has been attributed partly to the interplay of
legal and equitable doctrines that form the historical background for (he concept of
economic duress. See Dawson, _id., 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 at 288-289 (1947).
8
See Niedermeyer v. Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo. App. 654 (1895), where plaintiff
recovered an excessive tuition fee paid at the start of his senior year at law school;
Piitsburgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead, 202 Ill. App. l 77 ( l 9 l 6), where defendant
was allowed to recover an illegal payment made to obtain delivery of steel urgently
needed; Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. App. 508, 142 S.W. 1082 (1912), involving
refusal to deliver hogs as required by contract of sale, purchaser having in the meantime
resold; and Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, II5 Wash. 132, 196 P. 640 (1921), where
plaintiff recovered excessive interest payments paid on a land contract to avoid loss by
forfeiture of improvements valued at $200,000. But see, contra: Hackley v. Headley,
45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 5II (1881), wherein the plaintiff creditor accepted a note
for less than the undisputed amount of an unliquidated indebtedness simply because
of pressing need for cash at the particular time; Alexander v. S. A. Trufant Commission, (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) 34 S.W. 182, wherein plaintiff seller of oats was
forced to enter into unfavorable contracts with the buyer defendant because of buyer's
fraudulent threat of non-acceptance of the oats at a time of pressing financial need on
the part of the plaintiff.
9
See Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure: I," 20 N.C. L. REv. 237 at 255276 (1942) and cases therein discussed.
10
See Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure: II," 20· N.C. L. REv. 341 at 367382 (1942), for a discussion of the legal effect of a ruling that there was an adequate
remedy for the alleged victim of duress at the time of the application of pressure.
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late on the consequences of doing without gasoline, the lifeblood of his business
and the source of income for payment on the real estate contract, while the
resulting decision is reached.11
E. C. V. Greenwood

11 Two cases presenting substantially similar fact "Situations were cited in the
principal case but dismissed as not in point: Ferguson v. Assoc. Oil Co., l 73 Wash.
672, 24 P. (2d) 82 (1933), wherein recovery was allowed; and Standard Oil Co.
v. Petroleum Products Storage Co., 163 Tenn. 565, 44 S.W. (2d) 317 (1931),
recovery not allowed.
·

